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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH
B. L. CURTIS, C. H. CURTIS, and
J. S. SMITH, doing business under
the firm name and style of MAIN
REALTY COMPANY, and HEBER
G. TAYLOR and L. D. GARDNER,
doing business as TAYLOR-GARDNER,
Appellants,

Civil No. 8051

-vs.REED MORTENSEN and ANN
M·ORTENSEN, his wife,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Come now the defendants and respondents and
respectfully petition the court for a rehearing of the
above case and of the decision made and filed March 1,
1954; and state and allege that the court has erred in the
fallowing particulars :
1. In purporting to find facts not found by the trial
court to be such, and with reference to which there was
an issue of fact, and in basing its decision thereon, conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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trary to the jurisdictional limitation of powers of this
<'OUrt;
2. In disregarding the facts found by the trial court
as the basis for its decision.
3. In failing to apply to this case the law as estabilshed by this court and other jurisdictions.
4. In purporting to find facts on issues of fact not
decided by the trial court and presently undecided in
this case, and which is the exclusive function of the trial
court and beyond the jurisdiction of this court.

ARGUMENT
S.TATEMENT OF POINTS
1. IN PURPORTING TO FIND FACTS NOT FOUND BY
THE TRIAL COURT TO BE SUCH, AND WITH REFERENCE
TO WHI·CH THERE WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT, AND IN
BASING ITS DECISION THEREON, CONTRARY TO THE
JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATION OF POWERS OF THIS
COURT.

2. IN DISREGARDING THE FACTS FOUND BY THE
TRIAL COURT AS THE BASIS FOR ITS DECISION.
3. IN FAILING TO APPLY TO THIS CASE THE LAW
AS ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS.

These points may well be presented together since
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they involve the same basic questions.
\Vhen \Ye \\"Tote our original brief 1n this case we
candidly stated we were at a loss to ascertain the theory
on which appellants were attacking the judgment. It was
not evident in the brief of appellants whether they were
attacking the finding of fact as being unsupported by
the evidence or whether they were accepting the facts
and arguing the law on the basis of the facts found. We
did not anticipate that this court would treat the case as
one in equity and find its ovvn facts to suit the decision
that it felt the case deserved.
This is a law case. Under the provisions of Article
VIII, Sec. 9 of the Constitution, this court has no jurisdiction to find facts on disputed questions of fact. That
is the exclusive function and right of the court of original
jurisdiction as the trier of the facts.
It seems unnecessary to cite authorities as to this
limitation on the jurisdiction of this court in law cases.

-

I t is clearly stated in the Constitution, and this court has
on many occasions recognized that it has no such right.
We submit them only in the hope that by refreshing its
collective mind on this subject this court vvill remember
that if it finds facts in order to decide law cases it does
so in violation of its limited power in law cases.
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t·ourt 1nay not substitute its findings of fact for those
or the trial court.
l) id the brokers find buyers who were ready, able
and \villing- to buy on sellers' terms~ The trial court said
tl1('~· <lid not. True, it \vas stipulated that the purported
buyers wen· financially able to buy, but that is only one
part of the forHlula. The other two parts are the important ones. They were not ready and willing to buy, except
on condition that the transaction be optional with the
buyers to go ahead and buy or not, as the buyers should
determine after seeing the operating statement, and
upon the condition that in the meantime the $5000 deposit
ren1ain under control of the buyers.
The sellers' terms which sellers were willing to
accept were $5000 down and a binding agreement to buy
with a forfeiture clause of the $5000 if the buyers did not
go through with the deal.
The buyers' terms were: No binding agreement until
after they looked at the operating statement; in the meantime the $5000 to be held by buyers' agent.
That is what the trial court found to be the facts.
But this court says those are not the facts. Maybe a dif~
ferent trial ·court would agree with this court, but it is
not for this court to say what the facts were.
The trial court, reading the telegram from the
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Lyman vs. Totvn of Price, 63 Utah 90, 222 Pc.
599·

'

Osborn vs. Peters, 69 Utah 391, 255 P. 435;
In re Alexanders Estate, 104 Utah 286, 139
Pac. 2d 432;
Sine vs. Salt Lake Transp. Co., 106 Utah 238,
147 Pac. 2nd 875;
Horsley vs. Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 Pac.
2d 592.
The following basic facts were found by this court
as the foundation for its decision:
(a) That the brokers found purchasers who were
ready and willing to buy on the sellers' terms;
(b) That the reason the sale was not consummated
was because the sellers changed their minds about selling;
(c) That the demand that the operating statement
contain a showing of $20,000 as gross income was nothing
more than a suggestion of the brokers made after the
deal was made that it would be "nice" to have the statement so show.
None of those purported basic facts were found by
the trial court and the facts found by the trial court are
exactly to the contrary. Of.course, if there is no evidence
to sustain the findings of the trial court, this court may
reverse the case for a new trial of those issues, but this
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buyers to their agent, found that the signer of the contnu·t o11 behalf of huyers had no authority to sign on
bPhalf of th<· buy<~rs excepting on condition that the whole
d(~al should be subject to acceptance or rejection by the
lnt~·pr:--; aft<~r reeeipt of the operating statement. On the
other hand, this (~ourt says the ·buyers were ready and
\\' illing- 1o buy. The· evid(~nce sustains the trial court finding. Th<· buyers were willing and ready to buy only if
the <.leal pleased them after receipt of the operating
statement.
This court makes much of the fact that the buyers
brought a suit for specific performance and says in effect
that this shows conclusively that the buyers were ready
and willing to buy. There was no evidence that such was
the case. They were ready and willing to do what they
were obligated to do under the earnest money receipt,
which was nothing. Now here, in either case, did buyers
offer to or obligate themselves to buy. The utmost that
could be inferred from their amended complaint (Ex.
9) was that they were willing to look at the operating
statement. The findings of fact in the first case and in
this case are to the effect that the only thing the buyers
were willing to do was to buy if it pleased them after
receipt of the operating statement. Both trial courts so
found the facts to be.
Counsel in this case promised the trial court that
they would produce evidence showing that Rheinstro1n
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and Spencer were willing to vvaive the operating statement and buy without any strings attached. They asked
us to stipulate that buyers \vere willing and ready ·to
buy \vith no strings attached. We refused to so stipulate.
They then said that they would so show by competent
evidence; but they never did. We ask this court to read
this part of the record (Tr. 57, 58). That is where tl:e
evidence stood. Had the buyers been ready and willing
to make a binding agreement, as this court has assumed
to be the fact, for the purpose of its decision, a different
situation would have been presented. You would then
have had a new offer to buy on sellers' terms, but they
did not do that; they elected to stand "pat" on the first
deal and that vvas the deal they tried to specifically enforce, the one conditional upon approval of the statement.
The court finds as a fact that the reason the deal
fell through was because the sellers changed their minds;
that the demand to show $20,000 as the gross incon1e in
the operating statement was an afterthought and nothing
more than a suggestion that it would be "nice" to have
it so show.
The trial court did not so find and the evidence did
not so show. There certainly was at least a dispute on
that point. Both trial courts found that the operating
statement was an important and crucial part of the deal;
that the whole transaction hinged on it; and that the
buyers insisted on it. Both of the Mortensens testified
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that the buyers, through their agent, Torkelson, delnanded that the statement show $20,000 gross income.
Torkelson finally admitted that he demanded it. The
l\1ortensens testified that it was this phase of the case
that (·a used them to rescind; that they would not be a
party to a fraudulent representation. How can this court
find facts different from the trial court on this material
issue and say that the sellers simply changed their minds~
\Ve request the court to read Torkelson's evidence (Tr.
98), if this court has any doubt about the evidence to
sustain the trial court, and see what he finally said on
this point. It certainly was no afterthought. It was a
demand, so intended and so understood and so found by
two trial courts to be material parts of the deal. We
respectfully urge that this court transcended its lawful
jurisdiction in finding those basic facts and in disregarding the facts found by the trial court.
The undisputed and controlling facts in this case
are identical in principle with those in Reich et ux vs.
Christopulos, ______ Utah ______ , 256 Pac. 2d 238. The only
difference was that in that case the buyers gave a worthless check to the broker, whereas in this case buyers
represented that they had paid $5000 down, which they
had not. The earnest money receipt in both cases was a
whited sepulcher. It bore on its face the badge of legality
but beneath the surface, to which the trial courts looked,
it was dead. There was no life in it because the $5000 had
not in fact been paid and because the agent signing for
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buyers had actual authority different from that appearing on the paper. Everything that Justice Crockett said
in the R,eich case as to the applicable principles of law
has applicability here. vVe urge the court to review the
authorities cited in our original brief. A broker must
give the seller at least the righ't to accept or reject a
firm and binding offer to buy. So long as the matter is
still in the negotiation stage, which this was, the broker
has not earned his pay; and so long as the buyer attaches
strings to his offer, has his fingers crossed, it is still only
negotiation-not a deal.
The last Pacific Advance Sheet for March 19, 1954,
brings a California case so much like this one in facts
and principle that we take the liberty of quoting from
it at length. The case is Lawrence Block Co. v. Palston,
266 Pac. 2d 856. There, as here, the buyer and seller
signed an earnest money receipt, subject to consideration
and approval of operating and other statements to be
submitted and furnished by the seller. Those statements
produced problems and the deal fell through. The broker
sued the seller for his commission. The court said the
broker had not finished his job. As long as the buyer
produced by him had it within his power to back out of
the deal he was not willing and ready to buy so as to
entitle the broker to his commission. We qnote from that
case and urge the court to read it all.
"Plaintiff agrees that it is entitled to recover
only if it found a buyer ready, able·, and vvilling
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to buy on terms acceptable to defendant. It argues
.
however,
that N eidorf was ready, able, and will-'
ing to buy on the terms of his written offer and
that defendant accepted such terms by signing
the agr<~ement of January 27, 1951; consequently,
she cannot question the readiness, willingness, and
a hili ty of the procured purchaser to perform
a<'tording to the terms of his offer. * * * * *
. "Before a broker is entitled to compensation,
the negotiations which he is authorized to make
1nust be concluded or conducted to the state where,
as to all the material or essential terms of the
sale, there is a meeting of the minds or an agreement between the principal and the customer produced by him; but if the principal and the customer are unable to come to terms, the broker cannot recover. * * *
"Although the terms of a .contract need not
be stated in the minutest details, it is· requisite
to enforceability that it must evidence a meeting
of the minds upon the essential features of the
agreement, and that the scope of the duty and
limits of acceptable performance be at least sufficiently defined to provide a rational basis for
the assessment of damages. * * * *Where the parties assume to make a contract in which one's
promise is the consideration for the promise by
the other, the promises must be mutual. To be
obligatory on either party, the contract must be
mutual and reciprocal in its obligations. One who
promises to do a thing ·only if it pleases him, is
not bound to perforrn. Central ·Oil Co. v. Southern Refining Co., 154 Cal. 165, 97 P. 177; 12 Cal.
Jur. 2d 317, sec. 114. Where a contract imposes
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no definite obligation on one party to perform,
it lacks mutuality of obligation. It is elementary
that where performance· is optional with one of
the parties no enforceable obligation exists. * * *
This type of promise is illusory and does not
result in a binding agreement even if unconditionally accepted.
"The terms of the agreement gave Neidorf
two opportunities to decline to purchase the property. The Neidorf offer of J'anuary 27, 1951,
expressly provided that it was 'subject to' two
special conditions: 1) 'O.P.A. Rent statements
to be approved by Buyer,' and 2) 'subject to
buyer's inspection and approval of all apartments.' These conditions had the effect of reserving to the offeror the unrestricted discretion to
decide whether to be bound or not, even in the
event of an unconditional acceptance by the offeree. No standard or basis for these 'approvals'
is ·established. No hint is given as to what criteria,
if any, are to determine whether the O.P.A. rent
statements and all the apartments will be approved by the buyer. What are the rent statements to contain or show for the offeror's approval
to be forthcoming~ What are the apartments to
have and consist of in order to be 'approved'~ Are
they to satisfy him as to size, furnishings, decor~
Who is to judge whether he is satisfied with the
statements and apartments~ Only the buyer himself. It is entirely a subjective matter. Ellis v.
Klaff, 96 Cal. A pp. 2d 471, 478, 216 P. 2d 15. No
one could compel N eidorf to be satisfied for he
reserved these approvals to himself without limitation or restriction. The standard 'as to the
satisfaction of a reasonable person' does not apply
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where the performance involves a matter dependent on judgment. Melton v. Story, 113 Cal. App.
609, 613, 298 P. 1032; 12 Cal. J ur. 2d 440, sec. 219.
''By simply refusing to approve the O.P.A.
statements or the apartments, Neidorf could withdraw frorn the agreement. Actually, the Neidorf
'offer' was not an offer to enter into an agreement,
but an offer to enter into an agreement if he later
wished to do so. This illusory pro~nise is the
only offer that was submitted by plaintiff to
defendant. When by the terms of an agreement
the owner of property binds himself to sell on
specified terms, and leaves it discretionary with
the other party to the contract whether he will" or
will not buy, it constitutes simply an optional
contract. Johnson v. Clark, 174 Cal. 582, 586, 163
P. 1004. This was all that the contract amounted
to in this case.
•

•

•

•

:t:

"To entitle a broker to a commission, the
acceptance of the buyer's offer to purchase must
be unconditional.
:t:

•

•

•

•

"Plaintiff's commission was dependent on a
binding contract between N eidorf and defendant.
It chose to protect its commission by a contract
between other parties. Since they failed to enter
into a binding contract, it is not entitled to
recover."
The principles involved in the above case are those
which this court in all of the cases cited by us in our
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original brief has found to be the law of this State.
This court in Little l S. Gorman, 39 Utah 63, 114 Pac.
321, refused to allow a broker to recover his commission
so long as there was no meeting of the minds between
the seller and buyer. Where either party has the right
to refuse or deny the binding effect of the deal, it is
still negotiation-not a firm offer.
1

See also Best v. Kelly, (Wash.) 155 Pac. 2d 794.
We respectfully submit that this court erred in substituting its own findings of fact for those of two trial
courts and in failing to apply the law to the facts of this
case.
4. IN PURPORTING TO FIND FACTS ON ISSUES OF
FACT NOT DECIDED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND PRESENTLY UNDECIDED IN THIS CASE, AND WHICH IS THE
EXCLUSIVE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND
BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT.

Closely related to the points above discussed with
reference to finding of fact by this court is the undetermined issue raised by the affirmative defense of defendants, to-wit, that the plaintiffs, by their representations
to the buyers, involved defendants in a fraudulent transaction without authority, and that plaintiffs were insisting on defendants being a party thereto. That issue was
not determined by the trial court because it deemed it
unnecessary to do so in view of its finding that the
plaintiffs had not presented to defendants a binding
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offer for their acceptance. Defendants testified that they
did not know that such representations had been made,
did not authorize them to be made, did not know that
the operating statement was to contain such representations until rl,orkelson, plaintiff's agent, demanded it after
the earnest ntoney receipt v.ras signed. They further testified that they did not know until later that the $5000
had not been paid and that Torkelson had only limited
authority to sign for the Luyers. Plaintiffs testified to
the contrary so an issue of fact was presented.
That certainly was a good defense to any action by
the agent for commissions if believed by the trial court.
An agent has no authority to make representations on
behalf of the principal, exposing the principal to liability
for fraud, without authority from the principal. In this
State it is statutory. (Sec. 61-2-11).
Has this court also by its decision assumed to decide
that disputed issue of fact~ That issue is certainly open
to be tried.
The direction to the trial court to proceed in accordance with the decision seems to mean that this court has
assumed to decide all of the issues of fact, those found
by the trial court and those not found.
It certainly seems very clear that this court overlooked the fact that there are certain issues raised by
the answer which were not decided by the trial court
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because it seemed unnecessary to do so, but if the trial
court were in error as to its ruling on the law there still
remains the further defense presented but not decided;
unless, of course, this court has also decided that issue
of fact in this case.
We respectfully urge that this case should be reconsidered by this court and this petition for rehearing
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH, ELTON AND MANGUM
By H. A. RICH
ALLEN AND DANSIE
By W. DOUGLAS ALLEN
R-OBERT REES DANSIE
Attorneys for

Responden~s
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